THE CURRENT STATUS OF INSTANT TRIPLE TALAQ IN INDIA: ISSUES AND CHALLENGES

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Received: January 10, 2019
Accepted: February 19, 2019

ABSTRACT: Instant Triple talaq is a form of divorce under the Muslim laws wherein, the husbands pronounce talaq during a single tuhr either in one sentence or in one sitting. The distinctive nature of this form of talaq is that it comes into effect as soon as the words are uttered. Moreover, this form of talaq does not provide with an option of revocability and hence, leaves no possibility for the parties to reconcile. The only resort left with the parties is to go through the practice of nikah-halala. This practice of instant triple talaq, also known as talaq-e-biddat, had been in practice since ages until brought up in the case of Shayara Bano v Union of India¹, which specifically deals with the helplessness of women who have been subjected to instant triple talaq by their husbands either intentionally or unintentionally. The evil practice of instant triple talaq has been finally struck down in this case and had been a victory for the Muslim women who had been or could have been a victim to this practice. The authors in this article have tried to pour light upon the concept of Instant triple talaq and examining its validity under the Muslim laws. Also, this article studies the decisions rendered by the courts in the related cases along with the current status of instant triple talaq in several muslim countries.

Key Words: triple talaq, tuhr, revocability, victim, muslim countries

INTRODUCTION
India is a land of religions and every religious community has laws dealing with the personal issues of marriage, divorce, inheritance, maintenance and adoption. Muslims, Christians, Zoroastrians and Jews enjoy their separate personal laws while Hindus, Buddhists, Jains and Sikhs are governed under a single law i.e. Hindu Law.

Unlike Hinduism and other religions where marriage is viewed as a sacrament, under Muslim Law, marriage (nikah) is considered as a civil contract which is based upon the consent which is spelt out in the utterance of the word qabul. The Muslim Law provides different ways for the dissolution of this contract i.e. Talaq-ul-sunnat and Talaq-e-biddat. Talaq is an extremely sensitive affair which has the power to end years of marital relation between husband and wife. The Holy Qur’an also, is very cautious when it comes to the issue of talaq and says:

"And if you fear dissension between the two, send an arbitrator from his people and an arbitrator from her people. If they both desire reconciliation, Allah will cause it between them. Indeed, Allah is ever Knowing and Acquainted [with all things].”²

Talaq-ul-sunnat(also known as talaq-ul-rajeh) is considered to be the approved form of talaqas it is based upon ‘Sunna’ or Prophet’s tradition. Although, Prophet always considered talaq as an evil but if at all it was to take place, Talaq-ul-sunnat was considered to be the best option as it had the option of revocability whereas Talaq-e-biddat does not experience revocability. Talaq-ul-sunnat is recognized in both the Muslim sects i.e. Shia as well as Sunni. Also, this kind of talaq may either be pronounced in any form, either hasan or ahasan.

Talaq-e-biddat(also known as talaq-ul-bain) is a disapproved form of talaq. It is a practice which was once acknowledged to be bad in theology by the members of clergy but is being upheld as valid by the same people. A distinctive characteristic of this kind of talaq is that it becomes effective as soon as the words are pronounced and it does not have the option of revocability hence, leaving no possibility of reconciliation between the parties. Also, this form of talaq allows men to pronounce talaq during a single tuhr either in one

1 LNIND 2017 SC 415.
Talaq - mating the second marriage and then getting divorced and observe the marriage still remains irrevocable. The only way out in such a condition is through nikah halala. This requires the wife to remarry followed by consummating the second marriage and then getting divorced and observe iddat period and finally then come back to the prior husband. This form of talaqis not recognized by the Shias.

The issue of talaq-e-biddathas ignited a lot of debate and generated arguments based on gender equality, human rights and secularism until the landmark judgement in the case of ShayaraBano v Union of India⁵.

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
Talaq-e-biddatcan be traced back to the second century of the Islamic-Era. This form of talaq was also practiced during the life of Sunna or Prophet. There is a well-known incident of Abdullah Ibn Umar, where he had divorced his wife during the period of menstruation. When the Holy Prophet got to know about this case, he told that the act was wrongful in nature and moreover, advised to cancel the divorce and further to proceed in a proper manner if he was still firm on his decision of getting separated from his wife. The fact is that, Sunna strongly criticized talaq-e-biddat and did not approve it even tacitly in either form at any point of time.

But according to the views of Ameer Ali, a renowned Islamic Jurist, this form of talaq was introduced by the Omayad Kings as the checks in the Sunna's formula for talaq were inconvenient to them. Since then it came to be considered as a valid and alsolegal mode of talaq.

IS TRIPLE TALAQ IN CONFORMITY WITH ISLAMIC LAW?
The entire Muslim Law is based upon or we can say rest upon the four pillars of knowledge, i.e.,
- The Qur'an(kitab)
- The Sunnah (Hadiths)⁶
- The Ijma⁷
- Qiyas⁸

For a principle to be accepted as law, it must find a place in the aforementioned sources. If for a matter, the solution is found in the Holy Qur'an, then it shall be the final ruling of Shari'ah. In case, the solution cannot be found in the Holy Qur'an, then the traditions of Prophet, which are documented by his companions in the form of Hadiths, are looked upon. But if the solution cannot be found in either of the aforementioned sources, then only isresort taken to Ijma.

In Qur'an, it is nowhere mentioned that three divorces on a single occasion shall amount to divorce, that too irrevocable in nature. Also, the Prophet as narrated by Abdullah Ibn Umar said "Divorce is most detestable in the sight of God, abstain from it". Moreover, the Prophet described marriage as his Sunnat.Qur'an recognizes only two kinds of divorce, i.e., Talaq-Hasan and Talaq- Ahasan which are in conformity with the Prophet. The aforementioned modes of talaqare the most proper forms for the pronunciation oftalaq. Talaq-e-biddat, the third mode of talaq, is considered to be most sinful of all which was disallowed by Prophet himself.

In accordance with the holy Qur'an, husband is not supposed to divorce his wife during her menstruation cycle. When he divorces his wife, the wife has to experience a period of iddat, which is of about three months and in case of pregnant women, the iddat period is till she delivers the child. This iddat period is to be followed and during his period husband could take his wife with an intention to reconcile¹⁰.

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5 LNIND 2017 SC 415.
6 Meaning: the percepts, actions and sayings of the Prophet Mohammad, not written down during his lifetime, but preserved by tradition and handed down by generations.
7 Meaning: the occurrence of opinion of the companions of Mohammad and his disciples.
8 Being analogical deductions derived from comparisons of the first three sources.
9 Abu Dawud 9:2173.
10 Surah al-Baqarah 2:228.
Divorce which has been given two times is revocable in nature unless made for the third time. Once a muslim husband has divorced his wife, she cannot remarry him unless she marries another man and consummates and then gets divorced by his free will, only after this she can remarry her former husband. Although, Shias and Sunnis have separate opinions on the matter of Triple talaq but certain points such as: rules for purity of women, virginity, waiting periods specifically specified in Qur’an etc. are important for both the sects and must also be strictly adhered to in order to validate any form of divorce or talaq.

In the case of Shamim Ara v State of U.P. and Anr., the Supreme Court upheld its view stating Qur’an that there has to be some valid reason for divorce and also an attempt or an effort to reconcile. This opinion was furthermore upheld by several High Courts including the High Court of Kerela in the case of Kunimohammed v Ayishakutty.

EFFECT OF TRIPLE PRONOUNCEMENT

Triple pronouncement of talaq at one and the same time has always been a hot topic for controversies due to its characteristic of smashing the pious relationship of husband and wife in just one go. Various Islamic scholars hold their different opinions in this context which is due to their difference in interpretation and application of law. On one hand, some eminent Islamic scholars are of the view that no leniency should be shown towards the application of law in order to avoid people from taking undue advantage on that account whereas, on the other hand the other set of Jurists are of the opinion that talaq is a very sensitive matter and Allah wants his people to be dealt with leniency and every possible effort should be made to reduce the chances of separation. So they are of the opinion to consider three pronouncements as one talaq. Ibn Rushid, an eminent Islamic Jurist is also of the view that talaq should not be allowed to be revoked by husband on indefinite occasions as through this he could harass his wife by every time revoking talaq before the expiry of her iddat period. Similarly, irrevocable divorce would also provide hardship to the husbands as they would get no opportunity to revoke his act. Hence, Ibn Rushid concludes to hold three pronouncements at one and same time which would amount to three divorces. The other set of Jurists held the opinion that if the second and third pronouncements were made in order to emphasise the first pronouncement, then only a revocable divorce shall be affected. They then applied the same rule to the other situation that when the second or third pronouncement had been made under momentary excitement without the intention to pronounce revocable divorce, a final divorce must be affected as soon as the last pronouncement i.e. third pronouncement is made irrespective of the intention of the husband.

In order to find a midway through this vexed controversy, it becomes mandatory to look into the Islamic Jurisprudence Qur’an, Ahadith, Ijma scholastic thoughts and also several judicial pronouncements in regard to triple pronouncement.

PRESENCE OF WIFE ON DECLARATION

Whether the presence of wife is mandatory at the time of declaration or pronouncement of triple talaq? This question has been answered in the case of Anisha Bibi v Qazi Ibrahim where the court held that where the words of divorce i.e. “I divorce thee thrice”, or “ I divorce thee, I divorce thee, I divorce thee” or “I divorce thee irrevocably” were addressed to wife by name and render her Haram for himself, showing the clear intention to dissolve the marriage which is further followed by execution of a deed for divorce stating that three divorces were given in the abominable form i.e. Talaq-e-biddat, the presence of wife is unnecessary.

In the case of Fulchand v Namal Ali, it was held that the presence of wife or her absence at the time of pronouncement of Triple divorce does not make a difference so far as its effectiveness is the concern. Justice Subba Rao opined that “We, therefore, hold that it is not necessary for the wife to be present when the talaq is pronounced. Triple divorce to be effective, it is imperative that it should be addressed to the wife in a particular sense.”

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13 2010 (2) KHC 63.
14 (1910) 3, Madras 22.
15 (1911) 36 Calcutta 184.
DOES 'TALAQ-E-BIDDAT' VIOLATE THE PARAMETERS EXPRESSED IN ARTICLE 25 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIA?

Talaq-e-biddatis a matter of 'personal law', which is applicable to a particular sect of Muslims, i.e., Sunni Muslim belonging to Hanafi School. As it violates the parameters of Article 25, can it be declared as not enforceable in law? In regard to the aforementioned question, a judgement rendered by the Bombay High Court in the case of NarasuAppa Mali authored by M.C. Chagla, C.J in paragraph 13 and Gajendragadkar, J. (as he was then) in paragraph 23, opined as follows: “That this distinction is recognised by the Legislature is clear if one looks to the language of S. 112, Government of India Act, 1915. That section deals with the law to be administered by the High Courts and it provides that the High Courts shall, in matters of inheritance and succession to lands, rents and goods, and in matters of contract and dealing between party and party, when both parties are subject to the same personal law or custom having the force of law, decide according to that personal law or custom, and when the parties are subject to different personal laws or customs having the force of law, decide according to the law or custom to which the defendant is subject. Therefore, a clear distinction is drawn between personal law and custom having the force of law. This is a provision in the Constitution Act, and having this model before them the Constituent Assembly in defining "law" in Art. 13 have expressly and advisedly used only the expression "custom or usage" and have omitted personal law. This, in our opinion, is a very clear pointer to the intention of the Constitution-making body to exclude personal law from the purview of Art. 13. There are other pointers as well. Article 17 abolishes untouchability and forbids its practice in any form. Article 25(2)(b) enables the State to make laws for the purpose of throwing open of Hindu religious institutions of a public character to all classes and sections of Hindus. Now, if Hindu personal law became void by reason of Art. 13 and by reason of any of its provisions contravening any fundamental right, then it was unnecessary specifically to provide in Art. 17 and Art. 25(2)(b) for certain aspects of Hindu personal law which contravened Arts. 14 and 15. This clearly shows that only in certain respects has the Constitution dealt with personal law. The very presence of Art. 44 in the Constitution recognizes the existence of separate personal laws, and Entry No. 5 in the Concurrent List gives power to the Legislatures to pass laws affecting personal law.

The scheme of the Constitution, therefore, seems to be to leave personal law unaffected except where specific provision is made with regard to it and leave it to the Legislatures in future to modify and improve it and ultimately to put on the statute book a common and uniform Code. Our attention has been drawn to S. 292, Government of India Act, 1935, which provides that all the law in force in British India shall continue in force until altered or repealed or amended by a competent Legislature or other competent authority, and S. 293 deals with adaptation of existing penal laws. There is a similar provision in our Constitution in Art. 372(1) and Art. 372(2). It is contended that the laws which are to continue in force under Art. 372(1) include personal laws, and as these laws are to continue in force subject to the other provisions of the Constitution, it is urged that by reason of Art. 13(1) any provision in any personal law which is inconsistent with fundamental rights would be void. But it is clear from the language of Arts. 372(1) and (2) that the expression "laws in force" used in this article does not include personal law because Art. 373(2) entitles the President to make adaptations and modifications to the law in force by way of repeal or amendment, and surely it cannot be contended that it was intended by this provision to authorise the President to make alterations or adaptations in the personal law of any community. Although the point urged before us is not by any means free from difficulty, on the whole after a careful consideration of the various provisions of the Constitution, we have come to the conclusion that personal law is not included in the expression "laws in force" used in Art. 13 (1).”

“...The Constitution of India itself recognises the existence of these personal laws in terms when it deals with the topics falling under personal law in item 5 in the Concurrent List—List III. This item deals with the topics of marriage and divorce; infants and minors; adoption; wills, intestacy and succession; joint family and partition; all matters in respect of which parties in judicial proceedings were immediately before the commencement of this Constitution subject to their personal law. Thus it is competent either to the State or the Union Legislature to legislate on topics falling within the purview of the personal law and yet the expression “personal law” is not used in Art. 13, because, in my opinion, the framers of the Constitution wanted to leave the personal laws outside the ambit of Part III of the Constitution. They must have been aware that these personal laws needed to be reformed in many material particulars and in fact they wanted

16 AIR 1952 Bom. 84.
17 Paragraph 13 of NarasuAppa Mali: AIR 1952 Bom 84.
to abolish these different personal laws and to evolve one common code. Yet they did not wish that the provisions of the personal laws should be challenged by reason of the fundamental rights guaranteed in Part III of the Constitution and so they did not intend to include these personal laws within the definition of the expression "laws in force." Therefore, I agree with the learned Chief Justice in holding that the personal laws do not fall within Art. 13(1) at all."

The position expressed by the Bombay High Court as has been extracted above, deserves to be considered as the presently declared position of law as it was conceded on behalf of the learned Attorney general of India that the judgement rendered by the Bombay High Court in the above mentioned case i.e., *Narasu Appa Mali* case. Furthermore, it was upheld in *Shri Krishna Singh* case as well as *Mahaarshi Avadhesh* cases, wherein the 'personal laws' had been tested on the touchstone of fundamental rights in the cases of *Mohd. Ahmed Khan v Shah Bano Begum*18, *Daniel Latifi v Union of India*19 and *John Vallamattom* case20. So far as the challenge to the practice of *talaq-e-biddat* in accordance with the constitutional mandate enshrined under Article 25 of the Indian Constitution is concerned, it would be pertinent to note that the 'personal laws' cannot be interfered with, as long as the same do not infringe 'public order, morality and health' or 'with the provisions of Part III of the Constitution of India.' This position has been clearly expressed in Article 25(1) of the Constitution. *Talaq-e-biddat* would have been violation of Article 14, 15 and 21 of the Constitution of India as Article 14 requires the state to ensure equality before the law and equal protection of the laws within the territory of India21. Likewise Article 15 requires the state to treat everyone equally22. Even Article 21 is a protection from the State action, as it prohibits the State from depriving anyone of the rights ensuring to them as a matter of life and liberty23. But as 'Personal Law' is a matter of religious faith, and not being State action, there is no question of its being violative of the provisions of the Constitution of India, more specifically Articles 14, 15 and 21 of the Constitution.

**THE TIGHTROPE WALK**

On October 16, 2015 a special bench was constituted in order to examine discriminatory practices of Muslim law such as triple divorce and polygamy made by a two-judge bench which comprised of Justice Anil Dave and Justice Arun Kumar Goel in the case of *Prakash v Phulawati*24 while deciding an appeal in regard to the rights of a Hindu woman to ancestral property. The judges referred to Chief Justice for the constitution of a special bench to examine the practices violating the fundamental rights of Muslim women which came to be titled as 'Re: Muslim Women’s Quest For Equality.'25 The Constitutional Bench comprised of Justice Kurien Joseph, F. Nariman, U.U. Lalit, Abdul Nazeer headed by Chief Justice J.S. Khehar heard the arguments on the days of May 11-18, 2017. Prof. Tahir Mahmood, an expert on Islamic law appreciated the strategy of placing four minority community judges out of five judge bench, and commented that such a move was much needed as the unruly media debates had given the issue an image of majority-minority scuffle.26 The bench furthermore declined to examine polygamy and restricted the arguments strictly to the question that whether instant triple *talaq* constitutes a core belief among Sunni Hanafi followers of Islam in India. Several subsequent writ petitioners’ application tagged along with original reference by individual Muslim women’s organisations inclusive of RSS affiliated Rashtrawadi Muslim Mahila Sangh, the All India Muslim Personal Law Board and several other associate organisations such as the Jamiat Ulama-i-Hind, the All India Muslim Women’s Personal Law Board, etc. The hearing in this matter attracted the public interest even during the summer vacation along with extensive report on the case every single day. The Bhartiya Muslim Mahila Andolan published a report on the study of around 4710 women and came to the conclusion that Triple *talaq* and polygamy are the main concerns among Muslim women and these are not just the concerns of the women who have been a part of the survey but Muslim women community as a whole. The issue of

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18 (1985) 2 SCC 556.
21 Constitution of India.
22 Constitution of India.
23 Constitution of India.
24 (2016) 2 SCC 36.
Triple *Talaq* received a huge amount of publicity next to demonetization affecting the country as a whole. In accordance with a recent survey conducted by Centre for Research and Debates in Development Policy (CRDDP) 331 divorces and about a quarter occurred due to the intervention of the religious institutions e.g. *qazi* and *darlagaza* and only about 0.3 percent of the total study reported ‘instant triple *talaq*’. Relying upon the Census data of 2011, the number of deserted Hindu women living in deplorable conditions (2.3 millions) exceeds the number of Muslim women who have been divorced and deserted (2.8 lakhs). These figures were presented before the Prime Minister during the election campaign in Uttar Pradesh and yet no heed has been paid to them. This is not a unique problem only for the Muslim Community but a social problem which is deep-rooted within patriarchy. Furthermore, the then newly appointed Chief Minister of Uttar Pradesh, Yogi Adityanath compared the concept of ‘triple *talaq*’ to that of ‘disrobing Draupadi’. A member of his cabinet, Swami Prasad Maurya, remarked upon this issue, and said that Muslims keep changing their wives in order to satisfy their lust and leave their wives to beg on streets provoking the members of the Muslim Women’s Personal Law Board and hence demanded his resignation. The mere fact that this organization has been campaigning for the concept of triple *talaq* since years shows the tightrope walk for Muslim women who have been demanding a strong change in their flawed personal laws. Furthermore, the decision by the Supreme Court in the case of Shayara Bano v Union of India upholding the instant triple *talaq* to be invalid was not an easy task and was actually like walking on a razor’s edge.

**MAKING OF SHAYARA BANO AND THE LEGAL PRECEDENT IN SHAMIM ARA**

Shayara Bano, who is being hailed as the champion of the Muslim women community was the first one to file petition in regard to triple *talaq*. After reference was made to the Chief Minister, a petition pleading to enact Uniform Civil Code was filed by a BJP activist Ashwini Upadhyay. The then presiding Chief Justice T.S. Thakur dismissed the petition on the ground that this prayer is enshrined under the domain of the legislature and furthermore questioned the petitioner’s motive for filing the petition. However, the bench affirmed that if any victim of triple *talaq* approaches the court it would analyze whether instant and arbitrary triple *talaq* is violative of the fundamental rights of the wife. Initially, Bano’s brother contacted a local lawyer in order to file a transfer petition in Supreme Court to transfer the case in the family court at Allahabad to her native place in Kashipur who in turn referred them to Srinivasan to file transfer petition in Supreme Court. Since Bano did not want to reconcile with her husband and wanted to confront the case, in order to bring an end to the debatable litigation, and the husband’s lawyer drew up a *talaqnama* and sent it to Bano by post. This act of his husband was brought to the notice of Srinivasan who advised them to file PIL on the ground that the aforementioned *talaqnama* violated her dignity and also Shayara consistently maintained that she did not want to reconcile with her abusive husband. Shayara Bano’s core concerns were: protection from domestic violence, access to her children, regular monthly maintenance and also a fair and reasonable settlement for future. After the filing of this case, several other aggrieved women along with several Muslim women’s organisations approached Supreme Court of India. In 2002, in a landmark judgement in the case of *Shamim Ara v State of Uttar Pradesh*, Supreme Court invalidated arbitrary triple *talaq* and plea of *talaq* in reply to the petition filed for maintenance by wife cannot be treated as pronouncement of *talaq*. Also, in the case of *Dagdu Chotu Pathan v Rahimi*, the Bombay High Court held that a Muslim Husband cannot repudiate the marriage at will. For this decision, the court relied upon the Holy Qur’an: ‘To divorce the wife without reason, only to harm her or to avenge her for resisting the husband’s unlawful demands and to divorce her in violation of the procedure prescribed by the Shariat is haram’. The aforementioned judgements were relied upon two earlier judgements i.e., Sri Jiauddin v Anwara Begum and Rukia Khatun v Abdul Khalique Laskar which had declared:

“The correct law of *talaq* as ordained by Holy Quran is:

1. Talaq must be for a reasonable cause and

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28 AIR 2002 SC 3551.
29 2003 (1) Bom Cr 740.
ii. It must be preceded by an attempt at reconciliation between the husband and wife by two arbiters; one chosen by the wife from her family and the other by the husband from his. If their attempts fail, talaq may be effected.”

Following Shamim Ara, there were a plethora of judgements which declared the instant triple talaq to be invalid, furthermore, safeguarding the rights of the Muslim women approaching the courts for maintenance. The general view of the society is that once a husband pronounces talaq, the wife is stripped of all her rights. It is due to the selective amnesia in regard to the struggles of Muslim women which made the petition filed by Srinivasan as the first instance where a woman challenged the concept of triple talaq.

JUDICIAL PRONOUNCEMENTS, ON THE SUBJECT OF ‘TALAQ-E-BIDDAT’

- Rashid Ahmad v Anisa Khatun

The facts: The primary issue that came to be adjudicated in the above case, pertained to the validity of ‘talaq-e-biddat’ pronounced by Ghiyas-ud-din, a SunniMohammad of the Hanafi school to his wife Anisa Khatun. He pronounced triple talaq in presence of witnesses but in the absence of his wife. Anisa Khatun received Rs. 1000 in payment of ‘dower’ on the same day which was confirmed by a registered receipt. Thereafter Ghiyas-ud-din executed a ‘talaqnama’ narrating the divorce. The ‘talaqnama’ is alleged to have been given to Anisa Khatun.

The challenge: Anisa Khatun the respondent in this case challenged the validity of the divorce, firstly for the reason that she was not present at the time of pronouncement of divorce. And secondly, that even after the aforesaid pronouncement, cohabitation had continued and subsisted for a further period of fifteen years, i.e., till the death of Ghiyas-ud-din and Anisa Khatun. According to Anisa Khatun, Ghiyas-ud-din continued to treat Anisa-Khatun as his wife and the children born to her as his legitimate children. It was also the case of Anisa Khatoon that the payment of Rs. 1000 was a payment of prompt dower and as such not payment in continuation of the talaq-e-biddat, pronouncement by Ghiyas-ud-din.

The consideration: The Privy Council while considering the validity of talaq-e-biddat and legitimacy of child born to Anisa Khatoon held as under:

“Their Lordships are of opinion that the pronouncement of the triple talk by Ghiyas-ud-din constituted an immediately effective divorce, and, while they are satisfied that the High Court were not justified in such a conclusion on the evidence in the present case, they are of opinion that the validity and effectiveness of the divorce would not be affected by Ghiyas-ud-din’s mental intention that it should not be a genuine divorce, as such a view is contrary to all authority. A talaq actually pronounced under compulsion or in jest is valid and effective (Baillie’s Digest, 2nd edn., p. 208; Ameer Ali’s Mohammedan Law, 3rd edn., vol. 2, p. 518; Hamilton’s Hedaya, vol. 1, p. 211).”

The respondents sought to found on the admitted fact that for about fifteen years after the divorce Ghiyas-ud-din treated Anis Fatima as his wife and his children as legitimate, and on certain admissions of their status said to have been made by appellant No. 1 and respondent pro forma No. 10, who are brothers of Ghiyas-ud-din, but once the divorce is held proved such facts could not undo its effect or confer such a status on the respondents.

While admitting that, upon divorce by the triple talaq, Ghiyas-ud-din could not lawfully remarry Anis Fatima until she had married another and the latter had divorced her or died, the respondents maintained that the acknowledgment of their legitimacy by Ghiyas-ud-din, subsequent to the divorce, raised the presumption that Anis Fatima had in the interval married another, who had died or divorced her, and that Ghiyas-ud-din had married her again, and that it was for the appellants to displace that presumption. In support of this contention, they founded on certain dicta in the judgment of this Board in Habibur Rahman Chowdhury v. Altaf Ali Chowdhury (1921) L.R. 48 I.A. 114. Their Lordships find it difficult to regard this contention as a serious one, for these dicta directly negative it. The passage relied on, which related to indirect proof of Mohammadan marriage by acknowledgment of a son as a legitimate son is as follows (p. 120):

It must not be impossible upon the face of it: i.e., it must not be made when the ages are such that it is impossible in nature for the acknowledge to be the father of the acknowledgee, or when the mother spoken

31 Parveen Akhtar v Union Of India, 2003-1-LW (CrL) 115.
32 AIR 1932 PC 25.
33 Paragraph 15 of Rashid Ahmed v Anisa Khatun AIR 1932 PC 25.
34 Paragraph 16 of Rashid Ahmed v Anisa Khatun AIR 1932 PC 25.
to in an acknowledgment, being the wife of another, or within prohibited degrees of the acknowledgeor, it would be apparent that the issue would be the issue of adultery or incest. The acknowledgment may be repudiated by the acknowledgee. But if none of these objections occur, then the acknowledgment has more than a mere evidential value. It raises a presumption of marriage a presumption which may be taken advantage of either by a wife-claimant or a son-claimant. Being, however, a presumption of fact, and not juris et de jure, it is like every other presumption of fact capable of being set aside by contrary proof. The legal bar to marriage created by the divorce in the present case would equally prevent the raising of the presumption. If the respondents had proved the removal of that bar by proving the marriage of Anis Fatima to another after the divorce and the death of the latter or his divorce of her prior to the birth of the children and their acknowledgment as legitimate, the respondents might then have had the benefit of the presumption, but not otherwise.

Their Lordships are, therefore, of opinion that the appeal should be allowed, that the decree of the High Court should be reversed, and that the decree of the Subordinate Judge should be restored, the appellants to have the costs of this appeal and their costs in the High Court. Their Lordships will humbly advise His Majesty accordingly.

The conclusion: The Privy Council upheld as valid, ‘talaq-e-biddat’, pronounced by husband in the absence and without the knowledge of the wife, even though the husband and wife continued to cohabit for fifteen long years thereafter wherefrom five offsprings were born to them.

**Jiauddin Ahmed v Anwara Begum**

The facts: The respondent Anwara Begum had petitioned for maintenance under Section 125 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Her contention was that she had lived with her husband for about nine months, after her marriage. During that period, her husband began to torture her and even used to beat her. It was therefore, that she was compelled to leave his company and start living with her father who was a day labourer. Maintenance was duly granted by the First Class Magistrate, Tinsukia. Her husband, the petitioner Jiauddin Ahmed, contested the respondent’s claim for maintenance, before the Gauhati High Court, on the ground that he had divorced her, by pronouncing divorce by adopting the procedure of talaq-e-biddat.

The challenge: It is in above circumstances that the validity of talaq-e-biddat and the wife’s entitlement to maintenance came up to be considered by the Gauhati High Court, which examined the validity of the concept of talaq-e-biddat.

The consideration: The High Court laid down reliance on verses 128 to 130, contained in section 19 of sura ‘IV’ and verses 229 to 232, contained in sections 29 and 30 of Sura ‘II’ and thereupon referred to the commentary on the above verses by Scholars and the views of the jurists with pointed reference to talaq. Furthermore, the High Court also placed its reliance on verse 35 contained in section 6 of Sura ‘IV’ and again referred to the commentary on the above verse by Abdullah Yusuf Ali, an Islamic scholar.

The conclusion: The conclusion as recorded by the High Court leaves no room for any doubt that talaq-e-biddat pronounced by the husband without reasonable cause and without being preceded by attempts of reconciliation and without the involvement of arbitrators with due representation on behalf of husband and wife would not lead to a valid divorce. Moreover, the High Court also concluded that Jiauddin Ahmed had mainly alleged that he had pronounced talaq but had not established the factum of divorce by adducing any cogent evidence. Having concluded, that the marriage between parties was subsisting, the High Court upheld the order awarding maintenance to the wife, Anwara Begum.

**Must. Rukia Khatun v Abdul Khaliq Laskar**

The facts: Rukia Khatun was married to Abdul Khaliq Laskar. The couple lived together for about three months, after their marriage. During that period, the marriage was consummated. Rukia Khatun alleged that after the abovementioned period her husband abandoned and neglected her. She was allegedly not provided with any maintenance and as such had been living in penury for a period of about three months, before she moved an application for grant of maintenance. The petitioner’s application for maintenance filed under Section 125 of Code of Criminal Procedure, was rejected by Sub Divisional Judicial Magistrate, Hailkandi. She challenged the order rejecting her claim of maintenance before Gauhati High Court. The respondent, the husband contested the claim for maintenance by asserting that even though he had married the petitioner

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but he had divorced her on 12-04-1972 by way of talaq-e-biddat and had thereafter even executed a talaqnama. The husband also asserted that he had also paid dower to the petitioner. The claim of wife was declined on the ground that she had been divorced by the husband.

The challenge: It is in the above circumstances that validity of the divorce pronounced by the husband by way of talaq-e-biddat and wife's entitlement to maintenance came up for consideration.

The consideration: The first point was to be decided whether the opposite party divorced the Petitioner. The equivalent of the word ‘divorce’ is talaq in Muslim law. What was considered to be as valid talaq was considered by Bahrul Islam J. as that the word talaq carries the literal significance of ‘freeing’ or the ‘undoing of knot’. Talaq means divorce of a woman by her husband. Moreover the case of Ahmed Kasim Molla v Khatun Bibi was also relied on in order to come to the conclusion.

The conclusion: The High Court listed several essential ingredients of a valid talaq under Muslim law. ‘Firstly’ talaq has to be based on some good cause and must not be at the mere desire, sweet will, whim and caprice of the husband. Secondly it must not be a secret. Thirdly, between the pronouncement and finality there must be a time gap so that the passions of the parties may calm down and reconciliation may be possible. Fourthly, there has to be a process of arbitration wherein the arbitrators are representatives of both the husband and the wife. If the above ingredients do not exist talaq would be considered as invalid. For the reason talaq-e-biddat pronounced by the husband did not satisfy all the ingredients as a valid divorce, the High Court concluded that the marriage was subsisting and accordingly held the wife to be entitled to maintenance.

1. Masroor Ahmed v State (NCT of Delhi)40

The facts:Aisha Anjum was married to the petitioner Masroor Ahmed on 02-04-2004. The marriage was duly consummated and a daughter was born to them. It was alleged by the wife that her husband’s family threw her out of her matrimonial home on account of non-fulfillment of dowry demands. While the wife was at maternal home the husband filed a case for restitution of conjugal rights before the Senior Civil Judge, Delhi. During the course of the above proceedings the wife returned to the matrimonial home to the company of her husband whereupon the matrimonial cohabitation was restored. Once again there was discord between the couple and the husband pronounced talaq-e-biddat on 28-08-2006. The wife alleged that she had later come to know about the fact that her husband had divorced her by way of talaq-e-biddat in the presence of the brothers of Aisha Anjum and that the husband had lied to the court when he had sought her restitution from the Court by making out as if the marriage was still subsisting. It was her claim that she would not have agreed to conjugal relations with him had she known the divorce and therefore her consent to have conjugal relation with Masroor Ahmed was based on fraud committed by him on her. She therefore, accused her husband for having committed the offence under Sec 376 of IPC., i.e. Offence of rape. She also claimed maintenance from her husband under Sec 125 of Code of Criminal Procedure Code. During the pendency of the above proceedings the parties arrived at an amicable settlement.

The challenge: The position expressed by High Court in paragraph 12 of the judgement crystallises the challenge. Paragraph 12 id as follows:

“Several questions impinging upon muslim law concepts arise for consideration. They are: —
(1) What is the legality and effect of a triple talaq?
(2) Does a talaq given in anger result in dissolution of marriage?
(3) What is the effect of non-communication of the talaq to the wife?
(4) Was the purported talaq of October 2005 valid?
(5) What is the effect of the second nikah of 19.4.2006?”

The consideration: While considering the legality and effect of talaq-e-biddat, the High Court recorded the following:

“There is no difficulty with talaq ahasan and talaq Hasan. Both have legal recognition under all fiqh schools, sunni or shia. The difficulty lies with triple divorce which is classed as bidaat(an innovation). Generally speaking the shia schools do not recognise triple talaq as bringing about a valid divorce. There is however difference of opinions even within the sunni schools as to whether the triple talaq should be treated as three talaqs, irrevocably bringing to an end the marital relationship or as triple talaq, operating in much the same way as an ahasan talaq.”

The conclusion: The High Court arrived on following decision:

40 2008 (103) DRJ 137.
"It is accepted by all schools of law that talaq-e-bidaat is sinful. Yet some schools regard it as valid. Courts in India have also held it to be valid. The expression bad in theology but valid in law is often used in this context. The fact remains that it is considered to be sinful. It was deprecated by prophet Muhammad. It is definitely not recommended or even approved by any school. It is not even considered to be a valid divorce by Shia schools. There are views even amongst the Sunni schools that the triple talaq pronounced in one go would not be regarded as three talaqs but only as one. Judicial notice can be taken of the fact that the harsh abruptness of triple talaq has brought about extreme misery to the divorced women and even to the men who are left with no chance to undo the wrong or any scope to bring about a reconciliation. It is an innovation which may have served a purpose at a particular point of time in history but, if it is rooted out such a move would not be contrary to any basic tenet of Islam or the Quran or any ruling of the Prophet Muhammad."

- **Shayara Bano v Union of India**
  
The facts: Shayara Bano, the petitioner, was married to Rizwan Ahmed for about fifteen years. Rizwan Ahmed, the husband in 2006 divorced her through talaq-e-bidaat due to which Shayara Bano, the petitioner, filed a Writ Petition in the Supreme Court which challenged the constitutional validity of three practices namely talaq-e-bidaat, polygamy, nikah-halala which violated Articles 14, 15, 21, 25 of the Constitution of India.

On 16 February, the court in its order demanded written submissions from Shayara Bano, the aggrieved petitioner, the Union of India, women's rights bodies and the All India Muslim Personal Law Board (AIMPLB) on the issue of talaq-e-bidaat, nikah-halala and polygamy. The petitioner's plea was supported by The Union of India and Bebaak Collective and Bhartiya Muslim Mahila Andolan (BMMA) whereas the AIMPLB argued that Muslim personal law is uncodified and hence not subject to constitutional judicial review. Furthermore, AIMPLB contended that these practices are essential parts of the Islamic religion and also protected under Article 25 of the Constitution.

After Shayara Bano's petition was accepted, a constitutional bench of five judges was formed by the Apex Court.

The challenge: The challenges before the Court was to decide whether or not the practice of talaq-e-biddat one of the essential practices of the Islamic religion and also that whether or not such practices are in violation of the fundamental rights guaranteed under the Indian Constitution?

The consideration: In order to come to the conclusion the Holy Qur'an and the Hadiths were referred to. Also laws of Arab states, Southeast Asian states, Sub-continental states were relied upon. Furthermore several judicial pronouncements such as Rashid Ahmad v Anisa Khatun, Jiauddin Ahmed v Anwara Begum, Must. Rukia Khatun v Abdul Khalique Laskar, Masroor Ahmed v State (NCT of Delhi) etc. were considered.

The conclusion: The Lordships had arrived to the conclusion that the legal challenge raised at the behest of the petitioners must fail on the judicial front. But as it may, the question still remains that whether this is a fit case to exercise the jurisdiction under Article 142. It was held that talaq-e-biddat is gender discriminatory and Muslim husbands had been injunctioned from pronouncing talaq-e-biddatas a means for severing their matrimonial relationship. The instant injunction shall in the first instance be operative for a period of six months. If the legislative process commences before the expiry of six months and a positive decision emerges towards redefining talaq-e-biddat as one or alternatively, if it is decided that the practice of triple talaq be done away with altogether, the injunction would continue, till the legislation is finally enacted, failing which the operation shall cease to operate.

**THE ROAD AHEAD**

In the historic judgement of Shayara Bano v Union of India in wherein the manifestly arbitrary practice of instant triple talaq has been set aside with a majority 3:2 judgement, the former Chief Justice Khehar had asked the government to promulgate a legislation within a period of six months from the judgement in order to govern the marriage and divorce in the Muslim Community. Accordingly, the Government promulgated the **Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on Marriage) Bill, 2017** also known as the **Triple Talaq Bill**. The sole aim of this legislation was to criminalise the pronouncement of the instant triple talaq. Apart from criminalizing the pronouncement of the instant triple talaq and making it void the act aimed at following:

- Subsistence allowance from the husband for the livelihood
- Custody of minor children
- Daily supporting needs of both, the wife and the dependent children

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41 LNIND 2017 SC 415.
42 LNIND 2017 SC 415.
However, this Bill got clearance from the Lok Sabha in December, 2017 but was blocked by the Rajya Sabha. As the government could not get the bill passed in the Upper House, hence it had to take another route in order to criminalise the pronouncement of instant triple talaq and that was through ordinance. The President of India, Ram Nath Kovind, on 20 September 2018 promulgated an ordinance namely Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on Marriage) Ordinance 2018. Several changes have been made in the ordinance as per the recommendations of the Rajya Sabha while refusing to pass the Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on Marriage) Bill, 2017.

The Government has once again introduced the Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on Marriage) Bill, 2018. Three amendments have been made in this new bill which are as follows:

- Only the victim and her blood relatives can file a case against her husband
- The case can be dropped only if the victim wife decides to do so
- The Magistrate can release the husband on bail only after hearing the wife

This Bill was given thumbs up in the Lower House, i.e. The Lok Sabha but was yet again blocked by the Rajya Sabha.

Amid the journey of non-passage of the Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on Marriage) Bill, in the Rajya Sabha, the government had to repromulgate the ordinance known as Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on Marriage) Ordinance, 2019. Under this ordinance the pronouncement of instant triple talaq is unlawful as well as void and any person practicing it, will face jail term for a period of three years. Also this ordinance empowers the women to approach the magistrate to seek custody of their minor children along with seeking subsistence allowance for both, the wife as well as the children.

STATUSES OF INSTANT TRIPLE TALAQ IN SEVERAL MUSLIM COUNTRIES

After delivering the historic judgment of ShayaraBano v Union of India43, India has entered the list of the countries where the pronouncement of triple talaq is considered to be un-Islamic. Different Muslim jurists hold a different view while considering the concept of instant triple talaq. On one hand, majority of Sunni jurists, consider the pronouncement of the word ‘talaq’ three times in succession as three different pronouncements of ‘talaq’, whereas on the other hand, the great scholars namely Ibn Taimiyah, Ibn al Qayyim and Shia Imamiyah, consider pronouncement of the word ‘talaq’ three times in a single sitting as only one ‘talaq’. Most of the Muslim countries such as Egypt, Jordan, Morocco, Sudan, Libya, Bahrain, etc. have relied upon the view of Ibn Taimiyah, Ibn al Qayyim and Shia Imamiyah while formulating laws in this regard. After declaring the pronouncement of instant triple talaq as invalid, different countries have adopted different measures to deal with the issue, some of which are enumerated here.

- Egypt

    Egypt became the first country to deviate from the view of majority Muslim jurists and adopt the view of the scholars, wherein three pronouncements of talaq are considered as single pronouncement. Also, the 3 talaqs are considered to be revocable unless pronounced one by one in each tuhr.

- Tunisia

    In Tunisia, the matters of marriage and divorce fall under the ambit of the state. As per Article 30 of the Tunisian Code of Personal Status, 1956, divorce pronounced outside the court of law will not hold any validity. This means that husband does not have the power to divorce his wife verbally without any consultation with a judge and moreover, he has to explain the reason of such divorce.

Also, Article 32 of the Tunisian Code of Personal Status, 1956, focuses upon the efforts of the court to reconcile the parties. As per this law, any proceedings related to divorce can only occur after the court has attempted at reconciling the parties and failed to do so. Also, under this law, both the parties have right to ask for the divorce provided that they have to explain their reasons for the aforesaid action. Moreover, if the court feels that one party has been harmed by the other, it has been vested with the power to make the either party, either husband or wife, to compensate to the other.

- Sri Lanka

    The legislation governing the concept of triple talaq in Sri Lanka, i.e. Sri Lanka’s Marriage and Divorce (Muslim)Act, 1951, as amended in 2006 is considered to be the most ideal legislation on the concept of triple talaq by Muhammad Munir, a Muslim expert. As per this Act, the husband who intends to divorce his wife has to notify such intention to the Qadi, i.e. Muslim Judge through a notice. The Qadi along with the...

43 LNIND 2017 SC 415.
relatives, the elders of the said partners and also influential Muslims of the area shall attempt to reconcile the spouses. However, if after giving notice to the Qadi, the attempt to reconcile remains fruitless, then the husband can pronounce talaq after 30 days of such notice provided that, such talaq has to be pronounced before the Qadi and two witnesses.

- **Pakistan**
  The laws regarding Triple Talaq in Pakistan is similar to that of the laws in Egypt, wherein the husband has to pronounce talaq in three successive menstrual cycles, in order to pronounce a valid talaq. Under the Muslim Family Law Ordinance, 1961 the husband intending to divorce his wife shall give a notice to the Chairman of Council Union. Meanwhile, after 30 days of such notice, the Council Union will try to reconcile the spouses via an Arbitration Council during the waiting period of 90 days. If the Arbitration remains fruitless, then the divorce will be considered as valid.

- **Iraq**
  In Iraq, as per the Iraq Law of Personal Status, 1959, three pronouncements of talaq in one sitting is considered as only one pronouncement. Also, under this law, both the spouses have been provided the right to ask for divorce, in case the dissension arises, whether before or after consummation. The Court under the aforesaid act has been given the power to investigate into the reasons for such dissension. Furthermore, the court can appoint two arbitrators for the attempt to reconcile the spouses. The court is the ultimate decision maker in the matter.

**CONCLUSION**

The journey of the striking down of Triple Talaq was a tightrope walk for the Muslim women who were previously bound to follow the unconstitutional practices enshrined Muslim Personal Laws. Inspite of knowing what situations they would have to face after getting divorced, they quietly accepted it either with or without their consent which has never been a matter of concern under the Islamic laws.

The reasons for them to quietly accept this practice was that these women were either not aware of the existence of laws for women or they did not have the money, resources as well as family support in this matter. Also, the unavailability of proper laws in this matter and the consequences that they might have to face at the hands of their families after complaining against their husbands held them back to quietly accept this evil practice.

It was believed that Muslim wives would have to suffer this tyranny for all times and their personal law would remain so cruel towards them until a brave lady named ShayaraBano, who was also a victim of triple divorce, decided to fight for the rights of every Muslim woman and challenge the Islamic laws. Her journey would definitely not have been easy but the result is actually a great victory providing justice to the Muslim women community as a whole.

The decision was a victory for the Muslim women and has been celebrated throughout the country. It was considered as the beginning of a long overdue amendment of discriminatory personal laws. The continuous promulgation of the Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on Marriage) Bill and also the ordinance by the government shows that they are ready to stand shoulder to shoulder with all the victimised Muslim sisters to not let them suffer more.

The battle for gender equality still has a long way to go, and this victory has paved a path for many more victories on their way.

**RECOMMENDATIONS**

It is high time as well as the need of the hour to take some major steps to bring about some necessary changes in the Islamic Personal Laws in India. In order to achieve these necessary changes several steps are needed to be taken:-

- **Codification of the muslim personal law:**
  The Muslim Personal law is in an urgent need for codification and hence must now be undertaken seriously by some legal experts or scholars or organisations or liberal ulema. Gender-unjust laws must be removed and gender equality must be followed. Also the Muslim women community and organizations must come out in support for the change.

- **Role of the state:**
  Parliament along with the help of its advisors should form a secular code inclusive of both Hindu Laws as well as Muslim Laws which must be drawn from principles of justice, human rights and personal freedom in the country. Strict actions need be taken in the cases where Islamic Laws violate the democratic rights guaranteed to the individuals by the Constitution.
• Encouraging the idea of a uniform civil code:
The idea to encourage the Uniform Civil Code in the country will help to eradicate many evil ideologies and traditions which are unjust and have given birth to irrational practices which are prevalent across the country since ages, furthermore helping in strengthening the integrity as well as unity of the country

• Introduction of gender just personal laws:
Most of the personal laws prevalent in our country reflects the ideologies of the society and further provides an inferior status to women. So in order to eradicate this evil from the very roots we are in an urgent need of gender just personal laws. The gender just code has to be the same for all the communities and hence providing uniformity.

• Prioritisation of gender equality:
Equality must be given the utmost priority in regard to their fundamental rights enshrined under the constitution of India. There has been an expressed provision in the Indian Constitution but it is not being implemented strictly and for the sake of the welfare of the society as a whole strict implementation is much needed.
The Constitution of India enshrines the rights to minority communities to freely propagate and practice their religion, own property and establish places of worship and run educational institutions. Furthermore, in a democratic country religious laws cannot triumph over the right to equality guaranteed by the constitution of the country.

Thus it is the need of the hour to respect both the genders with a common denominator along with the rights provided to them under the Indian Constitution.

No gender should be deprived of his or her fundamental rights in the name of personal laws.
The case of ShayaraBano v Union of India has played and given a spark to the heated topic of gender biased practices in the Islamic Laws and has set a benchmark as to how mandatory it is to fight for our rights and finally enjoy the victory as well as the fundamental rights provided by our democratic country.

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